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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/01/2008 Accident number: 478 
Accident time: 10:42 Accident Date: 13/08/2006 
Where it occurred: IR No.10/2, Beyr 
Mathkour, Wadi Araba
Country: Jordan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 13/08/2006 
ID original source: NS-10-2/13/08/06 Name of source: JES 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: No 10 AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
hard 
Date record created: 17/01/2008 Date  last modified: 17/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: E 35.184 Map north: N 30.476 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
use of rake (?) 
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Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in November 2007 as a PDF file. Its 
conversion to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The 
substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is 
held on record. The accident report is substantially the same as the report for another 
accident that occurred on the following day. 
 
INCIDENT REPORT 
MINEFIELD TASK ID - NS - 10 - 02 
SECTOR- NORTH SOUTH, PLACE - BEYR MATHKOUR, REGION - WADI ARABA 
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY – [Demining group Programme Manager] 
SECTION COMMANDER and TEAM LEADER [Names removed] 
TEAM: SITE PREPERATION TEAM 
TIME OF ACCIDENT: 10:42 AM 
DATE OF ACCIDENT: 13 AUG 2006 
NATURE OF INJURY: NIL 
TYPE OF MINE: NO-10 ISRAELI ANTI PERS MINE 
 
Details from IMSMA report 
The incident occurred during ongoing work in the North South Sector minefields. Buried 
device detonated while raking with Heavy rake. 
A [Demining group] Manual Team One, deminer hit a No.10 AP mine from the top that 
resulted in a mine blast. The deminer suffered no injuries. He was wearing his protective Vest 
and Goggles.  [Photographs of both Victim and PPE showed no damage.] The tines of the 
heavy rake were bent. 
 
The crater left by the initiation was approx 15cm deep and 30cm wide. 
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 The ground at the incident site was hard and flat. The weather at the time was clear, calm and 
hot. There was no vegetation. 
The demining team was founded 46 days before the accident. The team had been at the site 
for 40 days and working at the specific task for five days. They had been working for four 
hours on the day of the accident. 
The investigation was conducted by [Demining group] programme manager. The report was 
compiled and translated by a Medic. The report was printed on the day of the accident: 
13/08/2006. 
Statements by the Victim and witnesses were referenced [Not attached]. 
Apart from date changes and the name of the Victim, this report is identical to the report for 
the accident that occurred on the following day, 14th August 2006. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 638 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 41 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not applicable Time to hospital: Not applicable 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Goggles 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Goggles
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: Photograph of the Victim showed no injuries to face, hands and arms. Non-
injurious accident. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
photographs show that the initiation occurred outside the lane (marking is achieved by side of 
lane trenches) on ground that had not been “brushed” with the Light rake. In the correct 
procedure, the Light rake is used before the Heavy rake. It seems that Victim was working in 
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a manner that conflicted with authorised procedures and his mistake was not corrected. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Unavoidable” because there is not enough information in the 
report to be certain of the cause, and the deminer may not have been at fault. 
The failure of the demining group’s management (who conducted the inquiry) to produce a 
detailed report probably reflects their impatience at having to investigate a non-injurious 
accident but is still a significant “Management control inadequacy”. This report is substantially 
the same as a report for a second accident on the following day. The National demining 
authority should have accepted responsibility for conducting their own independent 
investigation. 
The demining group had put in place the use of a long tool (rake) that kept the Victim far 
enough away from a blast to avoid serious injury, but the raking process that this demining 
group has pioneered is only safe if systematically conducted in a disciplined manner. As with 
any tool, rakes can be misused. The most common misuse is “Hacking” at hard ground with 
the Heavy rakes, which this man apparently did. The distance still provided some protection 
and probably prevented injury. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under “Notes” refers to the fact that there was no 
evidence of any investigation in the papers provided, and no explanation of what occurred. It 
is also unacceptable that the report was simply copied and edited for the accident that 
occurred on the following day. 
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